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Gacaca and DDR: The Disputable Record of State-Building in Rwanda  
Shinichi Takeuchi* 
 
Abstract 
State-building is currently considered to be an indispensable process in overcoming state 
fragility: a condition characterized by frequent armed conflicts as well as chronic poverty. In 
this process, both the capacity and the legitimacy of the state are supposed to be enhanced; 
such balanced development of capacity and legitimacy has also been demanded in security 
sector reform (SSR), which is regarded as being a crucial part of post-conflict state-building. 
To enhance legitimacy, the importance of democratic governance is stressed in both 
state-building and SSR in post-conflict countries. In reality, however, the balanced 
enhancement of capacity and legitimacy has rarely been realized. In particular, legitimacy 
enhancement tends to stagnate in countries in which one of multiple warring parties takes a 
strong grip on state power. This paper tries to understand why such unbalanced development of 
state-building and SSR has been observed in post-conflict countries, through a case study of 
Rwanda. Analyses of two policy initiatives in the security sector – Gacaca transitional justice 
and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) – indicate that although these 
programs achieved goals set by the government, their contribution to the normative objectives 
promoted by the international community was quite debatable. It can be understood that this is 
because the country has subordinated SSR to its state-building process. After the military 
victory of the former rebels, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the ruling elite prioritized the 
establishment of political stability over the introduction of international norms such as 
democratic governance and the rule of law. SSR was implemented only to the extent that it 
contributed to, and did not threaten, Rwanda’s RPF-led state-building. 
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Introduction 
The international community has recently been promoting state-building in fragile 
situations.1 As stated in its “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States 
and Situations,” the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) is determined to “focus on state-building 
as the central objective” (OECD 2007c). In these principles, two areas of engagement for 
state-building are particularly highlighted: one is to strengthen the capability of states by 
enabling them to fulfill their core functions, such as providing security; the other is to support 
the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues like democratic governance 
and human rights. The DAC countries therefore consider that a good balance between capacity 
and legitimacy is indispensable in state-building to enable a durable exit from poverty and 
insecurity in fragile situations.  
Post-conflict situations can be considered to be typically fragile; however, the results 
to date of post-conflict state-building support have been debatable. Despite the OECD/DAC 
policy noted above, it has often been difficult to produce tangible results in the two areas of 
engagement. Countries like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the DRC) 
have not been able to greatly improve their state capacity to fulfill their core functions; 
consequently, their state legitimacy in the eyes of their people has not been enhanced. Other 
post-conflict countries have experienced processes of unbalanced state-building: although they 
have rapidly improved their capacity to provide basic services, their state legitimacy is 
problematic because of the authoritarian nature of the regimes that govern them.  
Although the predicaments of Afghanistan and the DRC are well documented, the 
problem of unbalanced post-conflict state-building has often been overlooked. However, it 
deserves detailed analysis, as it highlights the dilemmas faced by external actors. On the one 
                                                  
1. There are various definitions of fragility or fragile states, as shown in Stewart & Brown (2009) and 
OECD (2008b). We conceptualize fragility as being a situation in which human security is under 
continuous threat, with armed conflict and chronic poverty as its most prominent features. 
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hand, the international community has supplied assistance for balanced state-building in fragile 
situations, because a lack of legitimacy can cause violent conflict. Authoritarian governance 
and repression of human rights may cause grievances to accumulate in the population, thereby 
setting off rebel movements;2 the subsequent recurrence of armed conflict would completely 
destroy efforts to enhance state capacity. In fact, the donor community backed up corrupt and 
repressive regimes in the context of strategic considerations during the Cold War era, and some 
of these descended into severe armed conflicts (Uvin 1998). On the other hand, the causal 
relationship between authoritarianism and armed conflict is often too ambiguous to produce 
clear policy initiatives. It is quite difficult to predict the extent to which repression triggers 
rebellion. The dividing line between an effective centralized state and a repressive state cannot 
be easily distinguished; as a result, donors continue to assist authoritarian regimes with little 
enhancement of liberal values. These difficulties and ambiguities have created a wide gap 
between international norms and the reality on the ground. 
Similar problems revolving around norms and reality can be observed in security 
sector reform (SSR3). The concept of SSR, which emerged after the Cold War, is clearly 
different from traditional military (or police) reform. Active engagement of development 
agencies has considerably broadened the targets of reform and the meaning of security sectors. 
SSR includes not only core actors, such as the armed forces and police, but other ministries 
and non-state actors. 4  As the main purpose of SSR, the international community has 
emphasized the necessity of enhancing both the capacity and legitimacy of the sector (OECD 
2005; United Nations 2008a). For this reason, promoting liberal values such as the rule of law 
                                                  
2 .Recent incidents in North African and Middle Eastern countries clearly illustrate this point. 
3. Although, as we will later explain, SSR is a term connoting liberal values, recent reforms involving 
the security sector are generally referred to as SSR in this paper, even if they do not imply such values. It 
is almost impossible for outsiders to distinguish whether or not a program has been designed for the 
realization of liberal values. 
4. .According to the OECD definition, the security sector includes not only core security actors such as 
armed forces and police, but also security management and oversight bodies such as the executive and 
the legislature, justice and law enforcement institutions such as the judiciary and prisons, as well as 
non-statutory security forces such as militias and private security companies (OECD 2007a, 22-23).  
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and democratic governance is considered to be necessary in order to enhance legitimacy in the 
eyes of the population. Nevertheless, in reality, SSR has often failed to cause such values to 
prevail in the sector. We will argue, as Egnell and Haldén (2009) maintained, that the reason 
for this is related to the nature of state-building.  
This paper examines the reasons for this gap in the case of Rwanda. After the civil war 
and genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the former rebels, established a government 
in 1994. The RPF-led government has achieved internal political stability, although the 
authoritarian characteristics of the regime have often been criticized (Beswick 2010; Dorsey 
2000; Reyntjens 2004, 2011; Silva-Leander 2008). Since the establishment of the RPF-led 
government, several reforms have been implemented in the security sector. Although these 
reforms achieved the main goals set by the government, it is quite doubtful whether they 
contributed to enhancing legitimacy in the security sector. Thus far, Rwanda’s reforms have 
been subordinated to state-building led by the RPF, without changing the RPF’s power 
structure.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses gaps between 
norms and realities in state-building as well as SSR. In Section 2, two examples of SSR in 
post-conflict Rwanda will be examined and evaluated. Section 3 discusses the characteristics 
of Rwandan state-building after the civil war and examines the context in which SSR was 
carried out. In conclusion, we summarize the argument and examine how the gap influences 
peace-building in the country.5  
The information used in this paper was collected in the course of the author’s field 
research as well as from a review of the literature. Interviews in SSR-related organizations 
                                                  
5. The concept of peace-building and state-building are connected and sometimes overlapping, but 
distinct. Peace-building refers to a range of measures that aim “to reassemble the foundations of peace 
and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of 
war” (United Nations 2000, par. 13). While we understand that recent peace-building activities have 
been criticized for their “liberal” nature (Paris 2004; Newman et al. 2009), the definition used here has 
no connotation of such a specific ideology: peace-building is about ending or preventing war (Stedman 
et al. 2002; Wyeth and Sisk 2009; United Nations 2009). 
5 
such as ministries and national commissions were mainly conducted during a visit in August 
2009. 
 
1. Norms and realities of state-building and SSR 
The OECD (2008c, 1) understands state-building to be “an endogenous process to 
enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations.” As 
indicated in this definition, the DAC countries regard the concept of state-building as a process 
consisting of two related aspects: capacity-building and legitimacy-building.6 On the one hand, 
the state has to develop the capacity to rule in order to provide various services for its citizens 
(society). Although the most basic service assured by the state is security,7 contemporary 
states are meant to provide other services as well, such as education and public health. On the 
other hand, the state needs to establish legitimacy vis-à-vis society in order to maintain stable 
rule. No form of domination can persist unless the people ruled recognize it as legitimate. The 
ruler seeks to acquire legitimacy through various means, such as coercion, resource allocation, 
and power sharing (including democratization).  
The recent literature, both academic and practitioner, has stressed the necessity of 
developing the capacity as well as the legitimacy of the state in fragile and/or post-conflict 
situations (Chandler 2007; Roberts 2008; Paris and Sisk 2009; OECD 2010; DFID 2010; 
Manning and Trzeciak-Duval 2010). For example, the DAC places state-building as the central 
objective of engagement in fragile situations, and considers “supporting the legitimacy and 
accountability of states” and “strengthening the capacity of states” to be the two main focus 
points (OECD 2007c).8 The reason for this is that such balanced state-building is assumed to 
                                                  
6. For recent debates on state-building among donors, see, for example, Whaites (2008), DFID (2009), 
and OECD (2008b; 2010). 
7. Here, security refers to that concerned with direct violence, not with structural violence. Tilly’s 
argument, which emphasizes the role of war, is related to this aspect of state-building (Tilly 1992).  
8. The OECD Principles (OECD 2007c) do not state a clear priority between the two areas. However, 
considering the fact that the third Principle mentions “supporting… legitimacy” first and 
“strengthening… capacity” second, it is safe to say that the DAC does not prioritize capacity-building 
over legitimacy-building. 
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be indispensable for peace-building. For lasting peace, the state needs to have not only 
sufficient capacity to provide security, but also legitimacy in the eyes of its population. A long 
period of oppressive rule and/or a monopoly on political power being held by a small elite can 
stir up popular discontent and eventually reinforce causes of conflict and instability.9 With 
general support from the DAC countries, the idea that balanced development of state capacity 
and legitimacy is required to prevent the recurrence of war can be considered to be one of the 
elements composing present international norms (Lotz 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Peace-building and state-building in normative arguments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Author. 
 
In this normative framework, there is no tension between state-building and 
peace-building, as the balanced development of the capacity and legitimacy of the state 
contributes to enduring peace: state-building efforts are to serve the purpose of peace-building, 
at least in the long run.10 In this case, the relationship between the two concepts can be 
illustrated as in Figure 1. Any state-building efforts including SSR (A) can be seen as a 
                                                  
9. Many scholars have pointed to a causal relationship between repression (or grievance) and violent 
revolts. Among representative arguments, Gurr (1971) focused on individual motivation, while Stewart 
(2008) examined effects and consequences of inequalities between social groups, called “horizontal 
inequalities.” 
10. Although peace-building and state-building activities may be distinguishable in the short term 
(Wyeth and Sisk 2009, 16), their final objectives should be the same: creating enduring peace and 
preventing the recurrence of war. 
Peace-building 
State-building 
A
B
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component of peace-building efforts (B), while some aspects of the latter, such as civil society 
empowerment, are not encompassed by the former.  
In reality, however, tension can arise between peace-building and state-building. This 
tension often derives from the dilemma faced in state-building between short term stability and 
long term legitimacy. On this point, there have long been debates on whether capacity-building 
and legitimacy-building by a state are two phases that take place sequentially, or if they should 
be promoted simultaneously. A typical example of this is the relationship between political 
stability and democracy. On the one hand, although democracy is one of the most important 
elements for legitimacy-building, it can destabilize the existing political order; on the other 
hand, even if the state has enough capacity to maintain security, long-lasting denial of 
democratic governance can eventually heighten the danger of uprising. Although it is arguable 
whether there is any consensus in the international community about how to deal with this 
dilemma, the DFID expresses a relatively clear stance: while recognizing the risk of 
“promoting democratic institutions and processes in a context where there is a weak 
democratic tradition,” in insisting that “incremental democratic reforms should be introduced 
gradually alongside other measures to strengthen the capacity of key state institutions” (DFID 
2009, 21) it rejects “democratic sequentialism,” an idea that “certain preconditions, above all, 
the rule of law and a well-functioning state, should be in place before a society democratizes” 
(Carothers 2007, 13). 
Despite these normative arguments, balanced capacity- and legitimacy-building have 
rarely been realized in post-conflict countries. Capacity enhancement is not an easy task, but 
legitimacy-building is generally even more difficult and complicated. One of the reasons for 
this is that post-conflict states tend to prioritize capacity-building over legitimacy-building, as 
rulers seek political dominance over rivals, and usually pursue political stability more eagerly 
than other goals. Emphasizing capacity-building for the provision of security services, they 
often assign a lower priority to the rule of law and democratic governance. In this case, the 
8 
relationship between peace-building and state-building can be illustrated as in Figure 2. Some 
state-building efforts (C), while serving the consolidation of power, may bring about 
oppressive rule and may not contribute to peace-building in the long run. 
 
Figure 2: Peace-building and state-building in reality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
 
 Analysis using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators supports our 
identification of this tendency. We examined the post-conflict state-building process using two 
of the indicators: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, and Voice and 
Accountability. Annual changes in the indicators can enable us to trace the evolution of state 
capacity and state legitimacy, as political stability is a proxy for a state’s capacity to maintain 
public order, while democratic governance, measured by the Voice and Accountability 
indicator, is one of the sources of state legitimacy.11 As shown in Table 1, twenty countries in 
which wars ended after the 1990s can be classified into three groups, according to the patterns 
of changes in the indicators. 
 
 
                                                  
11. The credibility of the governance indicators has been hotly debated (United Nations 2007; 
Kaufmann and Kraay 2007; Williams and Siddique 2008). With regard to the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, difficulties in comparability over time have been pointed out (Arndt and Oman 
2006), and therefore our analysis cannot be robust. Instead, the purpose here is to use the indicators to 
roughly demonstrate three different patterns of post-conflict state-building. 
Peace-building State-building 
B
A 
C 
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Table 1. State-building in three groups of post-conflict states 
1. Both indicators remain low level, or the 
Political Stability indicator worsened.* 
Afghanistan (2001), Azerbaijan (1994), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), DRC (2002), 
Iraq (2003), Tajikistan (1993), Sudan 
(2005), Timor-Leste (1998) 
2. The Political Stability indicator 
improved much more than the Voice and 
Accountability indicator.† 
Angola (2002), Cambodia (1991), Eritrea 
(2000), Guinea-Bissau (1998), 
Mozambique (1992), Republic of Congo 
(1997), Rwanda (1994) 
3. Both the Political Stability and the 
Voice and Accountability indicators 
improved.‡ 
Burundi (2003), Croatia (1995), El 
Salvador (1992), Liberia (2003), Sierra 
Leone (2002) 
Source: Classified by the author according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
Note : Two indicators were compared for twenty post-conflict countries at two different time 
points: the year in which armed conflict ended (or 1996, the year for which the oldest 
data are available) and the year for which the most recent data are available. In order to 
secure comparability among the countries, however, the length between the two time 
points is limited to ten years: if one country takes 1996 as the starting point, the end 
point is 2006. The end year of war in each country is indicated in parentheses. 
 
* A country is classified as belonging to the first group when both indicators were less 
than -1 in the latest year, or the Political Stability indicator worsened during the years 
of comparison. 
 
† A country is classified as belonging to the second group when the Voice and 
Accountability indicator worsened during the years of comparison, or improvement in 
the Political Stability indicator was over three times larger than that in the Voice and 
Accountability indicator. This threshold was adopted considering that the average score 
for non-OECD countries between 1998 and 2008 was 2.05. 
 
‡ A country is classified as belonging to the third group when improvement in the 
Political Stability indicator is less than three times larger than that in the Voice and 
Accountability indicator.  
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 Seven post-conflict countries fall into the first category, where the two 
indicators remained low level and/or the Political Stability indicator worsened. In 
these countries, which were not able to enhance their capacity to maintain order, state 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population most likely remains stagnant at a low level. 
The second group includes countries in which improvement in the Political Stability 
indicator was much larger than that in the Voice and Accountability indicator. In these 
seven countries, political stability improved considerably, but democratic governance 
was not clearly developed. In other words, despite considerable enhancement of state 
capacity, state legitimacy in these countries remains questionable. The third group 
consists of countries that have seen steady improvement in both indicators. As far as 
the analysis using the two governance indicators is concerned, these countries may 
have experienced desirable state-building processes, as assumed in current 
international norms, although a detailed analysis would be needed to evaluate each 
state-building process.  
 Three points can be identified from Table 1. First, among post-conflict countries, the 
majority (the first and second groups) clearly adopts patterns of state-building that differ from 
the balanced development of capacity and legitimacy. Second, prioritizing political stability 
over democratic governance is commonly observable in countries in the second group. 
One-third of post-conflict countries (seven countries out of twenty) follow this pattern of 
state-building. Rwanda is a typical example of this group, as improvement in its Political 
Stability indicator was over twenty times larger than that in the Voice and Accountability 
indicator.12  
Third, the tendency to prioritize political stability over democratic governance is 
especially strong when political power is held by one of the warring parties. This is a clear 
                                                  
12. Rwanda’s Peace and Stability and Voice and Accountability indicators were -1.96 and -1.33, 
respectively, in 1996, and became -0.62 and -1.27, respectively, in 2006. 
11 
characteristic in at least six countries among the seven in the second group. In Angola, 
Congo-Brazzaville, and Rwanda, one of the warring parties seized power firmly after a 
military victory. Eritrea, which fought an interstate war against Ethiopia, has maintained a de 
facto one-party system since gaining its independence in 1993. 13  In Mozambique and 
Cambodia, where their civil wars ended in negotiated settlements, the former sole legal 
(communist) parties, respectively the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and 
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), have continued to hold power to date. In these post-conflict 
countries, the state capacity to maintain security has improved without clear enhancement of 
democratic governance. 
The relationship between capacity and legitimacy has also been problematized in 
debates on SSR. As donors have been deeply involved in the development of SSR since the 
1990s, the promotion of liberal democratic values, such as the rule of law, democratic 
governance, and respecting human rights, has been stressed in its practice.14 Abusive and 
unaccountable security forces as well as discriminatory justice institutions pose great risks of 
bringing about a recurrence of violent conflict (OECD 2007a, 30). There is therefore a 
common understanding among donors that SSR is necessary not only to enhance the 
operational capacity of security-related sectors, but also to cement such principles as 
democratic governance and the rule of law. This understanding underpins today’s restructuring 
of the sectors.  
Nevertheless, previous SSRs have demonstrated that there is a wide gap between the 
                                                  
13. Eretria is an extreme case, as its Voice and Accountability indicator worsened considerably (from 
-1.31 in 2000 to -2.16 in 2009): the regime became highly oppressive during the post-conflict era. 
14. At the outset, donor involvement in the security sector was mainly motivated by fiscal concern for 
post-socialist and/or post-conflict countries that had an oversized military sector. Since the end of the 
1990s, donors have been concerned with democratic governance in the security sector. On the basis of 
experiences in Eastern Europe, where SSR was a core aspect of democratization, and of development 
theories stressing the importance of governance (World Bank 2001), it has been emphasized that 
capacity-building in the security sector should be carried out in tandem with developing democratic 
governance, thus requiring holistic and comprehensive approaches by donors (Hendrickson 1999; Ball 
2001; Smith 2001). Whereas the OECD/DAC tends to directly emphasize the importance of democratic 
values in SSR (OECD 2007a), arguments in the United Nations have been more nuanced, where only 
the principle of the rule of law has been stressed (United Nations 2008a). The latter thus takes more a 
realistic approach than the former. 
12 
dominant norms mentioned above and on-the-ground realities; in fact, SSR results have varied 
considerably from country to country. While reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America 
seem to have been relatively successful (Smith 2001; Egnell and Haldén 2009), SSR 
experiences in other areas have presented a number of problems. On the one hand, countries 
such as Afghanistan and the DRC have suffered serious political instability and armed violence 
despite a series of SSRs (Murray 2009; Mobekk 2009). In these countries, the reforms could 
not enhance even the capacity of the sector. On the other hand, the reforms in Central Asian 
successor states to the Soviet Union are seen as having failed because of “personalized rule by 
an authoritarian leader backed by the security bodies” (Ball 2004, 4). In other words, SSR in 
these countries did not contribute to democratic governance in the sector, even if it might have 
helped in capacity-building.  
As has been seen in the example of state-building, SSR implementations in 
post-conflict countries have difficulty realizing simultaneous enhancement of the capacity and 
legitimacy of the sector. As Egnell and Haldén (2009) state, this is because the implementation 
of SSR tends to be strongly influenced by, and contextualized in, the process of state-building. 
How, then, has SSR been influenced by the state-building process? The answer to this question 
should be carefully examined through case studies. In the following section, we discuss the 
case of Rwanda and examine the consequences of SSR in the context of its post-conflict 
state-building. 
 
2. Security sector reform in post-war Rwanda 
The post-war Rwandan government has carried out a series of SSRs, such as the 
demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, police reform, and judicial sector reforms 
that have included transitional justice for genocide suspects (Gacaca). In this section, the 
Gacaca trials and the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants are examined in terms 
of SSR objectives and norms. Gacaca, which was established to deal exclusively with crimes 
13 
during the civil war, can be considered to be a typical case of transitional justice. The Rwandan 
demobilization and reintegration program is a type of DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration) program, although it did not include disarmament. Notwithstanding the fact that 
neither transitional justice nor DDR are particularly representative examples of SSR, we 
selected these topics because of their importance in the post-conflict state-building process in 
Rwanda. 
The impact of Gacaca on Rwandan society has been enormous: around 1.4 million 
cases have been completed, where the total population of the country is approximately 10 
million (Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda 2011). Transitional justice (Gacaca) and 
judicial sector reform are both regarded as being crucial in establishing the rule of law (United 
Nations 2004) and are thus key elements in SSR (OECD 2005, 21). It is therefore important to 
investigate whether and how the Gacaca process contributed to the realization of SSR norms. 
The Rwandan demobilization and reintegration program, on the other hand, has been deeply 
related to the military. In fact, as a consequence of this program, the number of personnel in 
Rwanda’s armed forces has been reduced by half. Recent literature agrees that DDR should be 
part of the much broader context of SSR (Brzoska 2005). Whether such programs have helped 
achieve SSR objectives thus deserves examination.  
 
(1) Gacaca 
 Gacaca is a grassroots system of justice that was used to deal with genocide suspects 
in 1994.15 Its most outstanding characteristic is its localized structure, wherein its jurisdiction 
                                                  
15. Much research about the Gacaca process has been published. As institutional aspects of the Gacaca 
process have already been analyzed in previous studies (see especially Ingelaere 2008 and Sasaki 2009), 
any related explanations will be minimal in this paper. The literature has been divided as to evaluations 
of Gacaca. Some expected the Gacaca process to be a model of restorative justice, supposing that it was 
based on tradition and promoted popular participation (Drumbl 2000a; 2000b; Clark 2008). Others were 
more skeptical, mainly because of its state-centered characteristics (Vandeginste 2003; Corey and 
Joireman 2004; Kirkby 2006). Many agree on Gacaca’s potential for restorative justice, but researchers 
who have recently observed the on-the-ground realities tend to be critical (Waldorf 2006; Drumbl 2007; 
Ingelaere 2008; 2009; Rettig 2008; Sasaki 2009). 
14 
has been set in the two lowest units of local administration: the Cell and the Sector.16 Judges 
are selected from local residents, and render judgment based on testimony provided by local 
residents. The post-genocide Gacaca began countrywide in 2005, according to the provisions 
of the 2001 organic law and after implementation of pilot programs in several regions; 
judgments on crimes against human beings (Categories 1 and 217) began to be delivered from 
mid-2006. Although the majority of judgments were handed down during the first two or three 
years, the trial process has dragged on because of the continuous return of refugees;18 the 
government announced in May 2011 that the Gacaca would be declared to be officially closed 
by the end of the year.  
 The Gacaca process has mainly been financed with internal funding; however, the 
government did not allocate much of its budget to this transitional justice. All members of the 
Gacaca justice system, including judges and witnesses, had to devote themselves to it without 
any payment. In a sense, this volunteerism was necessitated by the general reluctance of 
donors to assist the Gacaca process, about which some international human rights 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been skeptical from the outset (African Rights 
2000; Amnesty International 2002). A few donors, such as the Netherlands and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have provided some limited-purpose grants. 
 Although there were generally high expectations for the Gacaca process when it was 
                                                  
16. A Cell is the lowest unit of local administration and a Sector is the next-lowest unit; 9,013 Gacaca 
courts were established at the Cell level and 1,545 were established at the Sector level. Although the 
boundaries of local administration units changed considerably because of administrative reform in 2006, 
it was stipulated that Gacaca jurisdiction was to adopt the local administration units at the time of the 
organic law in 2001.  
17. The categorization of “crime” has often been changed. Roughly speaking, perpetrators of serious 
crimes such as planning genocide and sexual violence, as well as perpetrators who assumed high 
government positions, are classified in Category 1. Other murders and attempted murders fall into 
Category 2. Crimes involving pillage and destruction are classified as Category 3. Gacaca deals with all 
perpetrators except genocide planners and political leaders, who are to be tried in ordinary court.  
18. Although the government has repeatedly called for Rwandan refugees to come back, their rate of 
return has been stagnating. According to the UNHCR, the number of refugees and people in refugee-like 
situations originating from Rwanda amounted to more than 120,000 in 2009 (UNHCR Statistical Online 
Population Database, accessed on May 1, 2011). Most are in neighboring countries: 80,000 in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and 15,000 in Uganda. Many had sought refuge in 1994, when the 
RPF won the civil war, and have continued to stay abroad since then.  
15 
launched, these expectations differed and sometimes contradicted each other. Survey data 
collected in 2002 clarifies that perceptions and expectations respecting the Gacaca process 
were divided along ethnic lines, although both groups had confidence in the process (Longman 
et al. 2004). On the one hand, Tutsi survivors had high expectations for the Gacaca because 
they believed it would punish those who had committed crimes against their families, or would 
at least reveal how their family members had been killed; therefore they supported the fight 
against impunity and tended to demand severe punishments. On the other hand, ordinary Hutus 
expected that the Gacaca process would result in the release of innocent detainees who had 
been wrongly jailed: these people thus wanted milder punishments and preferred community 
service.  
 Apart from public expectations, the government had its own agenda for passing 
judgment on many genocide suspects. This agenda was very important for two reasons. First, 
punishing the criminals was imperative for the RPF, not only because it would help eradicate 
the culture of impunity, but also because punishing the previous regime’s crimes would help 
cement its own legitimacy. Second, the government was under international pressure to deal 
with the detainees appropriately. The number of detainees, which reached around 135,000 in 
1998 (Human Rights Watch 1999, 753), was clearly beyond the capacity of the existing 
national judicial system; international human rights groups also expressed concern about 
Rwanda’s very poor prison conditions. Moreover, even Rwandan government officials 
recognized the existence of many innocent detainees.19 In short, the number of detainees in jail 
was too great for the government to ignore. 
 Gacaca courts began delivering judgments in July 2006 and were supposed to have 
dealt with around 1.4 million cases by May 2011. Because of pressure from the government,20 
                                                  
19. In 1995, the prosecutor in Kigali estimated that 20% of detainees were innocent. In 1998, the 
prosecutor in Ruhengeri set the figure at 15% (Human Rights Watch 1999, 754). 
20. At the outset, the Gacaca was officially scheduled to wind up its work before the end of 2007 (see, 
for example, New Times, November 27, 2007). Against this backdrop, the government applied pressure 
to speed delivery of judgments.  
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the Gacaca process has thus proceeded rapidly, and the main government objective of passing 
judgment on numerous suspects has been achieved.  
 Has the Gacaca process helped to establish the rule of law in Rwanda? We would like 
to reflect on this point on the basis of both the literature and our field research.21 Assessing 
what ordinary people think about the Gacaca process is not easy, as they have ambivalent and 
complex opinions. On the one hand, many (especially Hutus) have come to appreciate the 
Gacaca process because it clarified who had committed crimes during the genocide. In fact, 
many suspects were found to be innocent. In both Cells where our field survey was conducted, 
the rate of acquittal was around 30%.22 The high proportion of acquittals may not be so 
surprising considering the huge number of innocent detainees mentioned above.23 Although 
Tutsi survivors often complain there have been too many acquittals—and certainly there have 
been dubious cases—the high number of acquittals corresponds to previous forecasts that there 
would be numerous innocent detainees. Although evaluation of each judgment on the basis of 
concrete evidence was impossible for us, we gained the impression, based on our analysis of 
Gacaca files and interviews, that the judgments generally preserved a certain level of 
credibility; in other words, we do not think that the judgments were systematically distorted. 
This observation supports Timothy Longman’s view that local inhabitants have the “contextual 
competence” to deliver correct judgments in communities (Longman 2006, 214). 
 On the other hand, there was obvious discontent surrounding the whole Gacaca 
process. Those who expressed the most open dissatisfaction were Tutsi survivors. They insisted 
that penalties were generally too mild, that the government had too frequently changed the 
                                                  
21. Since 1999, the author has conducted field surveys mainly in two cells (Cell B and Cell R) in 
Southern Province and Eastern Province (for their socio-economic background, see Takeuchi and 
Marara 2009). In recent years, we had opportunities to systematically read Gacaca judgments and 
interview the people concerned in each Cell. 
22. In Cell B in Southern Province, of the 451 cases dealt with during the period from July 2006 to 
November 2007, 145 people were found innocent. In Cell R in Eastern Province, of the 285 cases dealt 
with during the period from July 2006 to October 2008, 88 people were found innocent. 
23. Recent information from the National Service for Gacaca Courts indicated that about 30% of second 
category defendants were acquitted through Gacaca trials (Sasaki 2009, 299). The Minister of Justice 
stated that the rate of acquittal was 20 to 30% (Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda 2011). 
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guidelines, and that there was a tendency to mitigate penalties.24 They often suggested 
possible flaws in the process; in fact, distortion of judgments by corruption has often been 
pointed out. In addition, the logic of criminal trials would have had an effect on their 
discontent (Ingelaere 2009). Despite these grumbles, however, many stated they understood the 
government’s decision to release prisoners, citing government explanations for not being able 
to detain a huge number of prisoners because food aid had ended. It sometimes seemed as if 
they were trying to persuade themselves. 
 The attitudes of ordinary Hutus were more ambiguous. When interviewed, they 
tended to reply positively, at least in general terms. 25  However, some showed their 
dissatisfaction in a rather euphemistic way. A Hutu man, one of the richest peasants in the Cell 
in the Southern Province, said to us, in French, “Gacaca, c’est la politique!”26 He insisted it 
was useless to express his opinion because the Gacaca was a political show with which he did 
not want to be concerned.  
In fact, people clearly recognize the difference between today’s Gacaca and traditional 
Gacaca: they say the modern system is a Gacaca ya leta (meaning, “Gacaca of the state”) 
compared to traditional Gacaca, which is called Gacaca ya keera (meaning, “Gacaca in ancient 
times”). Although the continuity of the traditional Gacaca method of conflict resolution has 
often been emphasized, it is problematic. Despite the same appellation, the modern conflict 
resolution system clearly differs from the traditional one.27 The people consider today’s 
Gacaca to be a project of the government.  
By “government” we mean the RPF. Many rural inhabitants regard Gacaca as “victor’s 
                                                  
24. After the establishment of the organic law in 2001 (Law No.40/2000 of 26/01/2001), the law was 
modified in 2004 (Law No.16/2004 of 19/06/2004), 2007 (Law No.10/2007 of 04/03/2007), and 2008 
(Law No.13/2008 of 19/05/2008). Sentences in Gacaca are reduced if a defendant confesses his/her guilt, 
which should be recognized as the truth. In addition, the introduction of community service by the 
organic law in 2007 tended to further mitigate prison terms. 
25. Such tendencies of Hutu interviewees were also pointed out in Retting (2008). 
26. Interviewed on November 15, 2007 in Cell B. 
27. For instance, serious crimes such as murder were not usually dealt with in the traditional Gacaca 
process. See also Ingelaere (2009). 
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justice,” as it has never dealt with crimes committed by RPF soldiers.28 Despite their crimes, 
such as the massacre of civilians committed during the civil war and counter-insurgency 
operations around 1998, the government firmly refused to deal with these crimes in the Gacaca 
process. Thus far, the crimes of RPF soldiers have always been dealt with in military courts, 
which have delivered very mild judgments (Human Rights Watch 2008). Although the 
“contextual competence” shown by ordinary Rwandans is laudable, it is questionable if the 
Gacaca process has increased support for liberal values such as the rule of law, since the “rule” 
has been always determined unilaterally by the government;29 instead, Gacaca has helped to 
entrench the political order established by the RPF. In other words, the RPF has used Gacaca 
as a state-building tool.  
  
(2) Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants 
 Programs involving the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants have been 
carried out under the auspices of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission 
(RDRC), which was established in 1997. The RDRC approach is unique in that it emphasizes 
the reconciliation of ex-combatants “irrespective of previous military affiliation” (RDRC 2007, 
2). This means that the program targets not only government-backed combatants, namely the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF),30 but also the armed 
forces of the former regime (ex-Forces armées rwandaises, or ex-FAR) and other armed groups 
that were active in the eastern part of the DRC. The program did not have a disarmament phase, 
because the RPF victory made the disarmament phase unnecessary: the RPF’s military wing 
(the RPA) had already established itself as the sole legitimate military power at the end of the 
civil war.  
                                                  
28. Similar observations have been expressed in previous literature. See, for example, Waldorf (2006), 
Kirkby (2006), Drumbl (2007), Ingelaere (2009), and Sasaki (2009). 
29. The rules have been made by the RPF to suit their own interests, which is the complete opposite of 
the rule of law. See also the argument in the next section on the Constitution. 
30. The RPA was the military arm of the RPF. The current Rwandan armed forces (RDF) were 
established in 2002 based on the RPA (Law No. 19/2002 of 17/05/2002).  
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Two stages of the program have finished to date.31 The first stage took place between 
September 1997 and February 2001, during which 18,692 RPA soldiers were demobilized and 
around 15,000 ex-FAR soldiers were integrated into the RPA. The main problem during this 
stage was a budget shortfall.32 In this period, donors’ reluctance to contribute was caused by 
Rwandan interference in the war in the eastern DRC (Waldorf 2009, 9). The results of the first 
stage are therefore considered to be questionable at best.  
In contrast, the demobilization and reintegration mechanisms in the second stage, 
which was carried out between December 2001 and December 2008, were well designed and 
the implementation has drawn praise.33 Four positive factors can be pointed out. First, the 
program budget was guaranteed, as the international community provided almost the entire 
amount:34 there was no donor reluctance during this second stage. Second, the armed forces 
were clearly reduced in size. The size of Rwanda’s armed forces increased after the end of the 
civil war, as they absorbed ex-FAR soldiers, and reached a maximum size of 80,000 in 2002; 
the armed forces have since continued to shrink, to the level of 35,000 in 2008 (World 
Development Indicators). This rapid reduction is strong evidence of the program’s 
effectiveness. Third, the program provided special assistance for vulnerable people: in addition 
to an allowance at the time of demobilization and reintegration, a grant called the 
“Vulnerability Support Window” was provided for the most vulnerable ex-combatants. 
Moreover, special assistance was given to former child soldiers, female ex-combatants, 
disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants, and dependents of ex-Armed Groups35 (RDRC 
                                                  
31. The third stage was launched in 2009. 
32. Although the program budget had been estimated at US$38.9 million at the outset, only US$9.5 
million was provided by donors, thereby causing a shortfall despite a government contribution of US$10 
million (RDRC 2002, 6).  
33. Waldorf calls the process “highly successful” (Waldorf 2009, 4). 
34. Of the total US$65.5 million, the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) 
contributed US$30.6 million (47%). Other main contributions were as follows: US$14.4 million from a 
multi-donor trust fund, US$8.8 million from the DFID, and US$8.6 million from Germany (MDRP 
2008). The contribution of the Rwandan government was less than 5%. 
35. Ex-Armed Groups refers to combatants belonging to armed groups active in the eastern DRC, such 
as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). 
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2007, 4). Fourth, ex-combatants were given equal access to program services despite their 
former affiliations (Stavrou et al. 2007). With the goal of reconciliation, the program was 
impartially implemented without prejudice of ethnic affiliation.  
 
Table 2. Demobilization in the second stage: objectives and reductions attained  
(from December 2001 to the end of December 2006) 
 Number of ex-combatants  
 Objective Attained % 
ex-RDF (Adults) 20,000 20,039 100% 
ex-FAR (Adults) 13,000 12,969 100% 
ex-Armed Groups (Adults) 14,400 6,005 42% 
ex-Armed Groups (Children) 1,600 644 40% 
Total 49,000 39,657  
Source: RDRC (2007). 
 
Despite these advantages, the effects of the program can be seen as ambiguous in at 
least two ways. First, the levels of demobilization achieved differ considerably for the three 
target groups. As Table 2 shows, the demobilization objectives for the RDF and ex-FAR were 
achieved, but less than half those for the ex-Armed Groups were attained. During the program 
implementation period, former RDF soldiers and ex-FAR combatants remained in the country; 
in contrast, combatants in the Armed Groups were active in the eastern DRC: their numbers 
were recently estimated at around 6,000 (International Crisis Group 2009). Although their 
repatriation has been seen as a key factor in stabilizing this region, their numbers remained 
virtually unchanged for several years. The low attainment rate for demobilization of the 
ex-Armed Groups clearly indicates voluntary repatriation was unsuccessful, thus making the 
reconciliation questionable. This was not because the RDRC program was unpopular, but 
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because the Armed Groups have continued to fight: they have not yet ceased their violence. 
The Rwandan Civil War ended in 1994, but armed conflict continues in the region.36 The 
RDRC program does not impact on this internationalized aspect of the conflict. 
 Another problem is that the program has not changed the power structure of the 
armed forces. Limited information has been made public about senior officers, but there is no 
doubt that since the end of civil war in 1994 the core of the RDF has always been made up of 
ex-RPA officers. Between 1996 and 2009, all but two senior officers of the Rwandan armed 
forces were ex-RPA and Tutsi.37 Although the demobilization program succeeded in sliming 
down the RDF and in integrating ex-FAR rank-and-file soldiers, it made no impact on the 
RDF’s core structure, which consists of Tutsi former refugees. This fact casts serious doubt on 
the effect of the RDRC program in disseminating prevailing SSR norms in Rwanda’s armed 
forces. 
 This point is deeply related to Rwanda’s overall political power structure in the 
post-genocide period. After the civil war, the military was positioned at the centre of Rwandan 
political power (Dorsey 2000). This was natural for a new regime that had emerged from a 
rebel military victory: members of the RPF/RPA, consisting mainly of Tutsi former refugees, 
ended up in control of state institutions. Basically, this situation has not changed since then: the 
proportion of Tutsi refugees in the Rwandan political elite has been consistently high since 
1994.38 In addition to the fact that the former RPA commander Paul Kagame has continuously 
assumed supreme authority, the high proportion of Tutsi former refugees in Rwandan politics 
                                                  
36. Regarding the regional dynamics of armed conflict in the Great Lakes region, see, for example, 
Reyntjens (2009). 
37. The names, origins, and ethnicity of senior officers are reported in the Annals of the Centre d’Étude 
de la Région des Grands Lacs d’Afrique. According to this data, of 21 senior officers on the list, only 
two were Hutu ex-FAR officers. All the rest were Tutsi ex-RPF officers. One of these two Hutu officers 
was M. Gatsinzi, former Minister of Defense, who served as the Deputy Chief of Staff from 1995 to 
1997; the other officer, I. Bavugamenshi, who served as the chief of G1 Bureau, died in 1996 (data from 
L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaires).  
38. Calculated from data published in L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire, the proportion of Tutsi 
former refugees in the cabinet between 1998 and 2009 has always been high: ranging from 35 to 51%. 
“Tutsification of the state by the RPF” was also pointed out by Silva-Leander (2008). 
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demonstrates that the military has always had a strong influence on it. The RDRC program had 
no effect on changing this special relationship between the military and politics.39 
 
3. Rwanda’s state-building after the civil war 
(1) The background to state-building in Rwanda 
 Three background factors should be taken into account in order to understand 
Rwanda’s post-conflict state-building. The first is the fact that the RPF won a complete 
military victory. The civil war restarted in 1994 with the assassination of President Juvénal 
Habyarimana, and ended when the RPF militarily defeated the former regime and established a 
new government in July 1994. This military victory gave the RPF a free hand in post-conflict 
Rwandan politics.  
 Second, the RPF used the genocide for its own legitimacy-building. Rwandan leaders 
have always emphasized that only the RPF’s military victory stopped the genocide, and that the 
international community had withdrawn peacekeepers and was unable to stop it. In doing so, 
they delegitimized the former regime, as perpetrators of the genocide, as well as the 
international community, as an incompetent bystander.40  
 Third, despite these advantages, the RPF-led regime is fundamentally fragile because 
its political base rests with the ethnic Tutsi minority: the RPF will be defeated in elections if 
people vote based on their ethnicity. In addition to the experience of multi-party politics at the 
beginning of the 1990s, which eventually led to the genocide (Prunier 1995), the minority 
factor has drained any generosity from the RPF’s attitude towards ethnicity as well as 
democracy. The RPF-led government has denied the ethnic differences among Rwandans; as a 
result, mentioning “Tutsi” or “Hutu” in public has been practically taboo in the post-conflict 
                                                  
39. Although the exile of the former Chief of Staff, Kayumba Nyamwasa, in February 2010 
demonstrated a cleavage between the RPF and the military, the incident was caused by a power struggle 
within the political elite (Reyntjens 2010), and had no relationship to the RDRC program. 
40. Many scholars have analyzed particular ways in which the post-genocide Rwandan government has 
dealt with the international community. See, for example, Beswick (2010), Hayman (2008), Pottier 
(2002), and Reyntjens (2011). 
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period. Moreover, as will be explained later, a series of restrictive measures has been placed on 
democratic processes and institutions such as elections and the mass media:41 in using the 
concepts of “division” as well as “genocide ideology,” the government has oppressed potential 
rivals by accusing them of being instigators of ethnic strife. 
 
(2) In pursuit of political stability 
 From the rulers’ point of view, political stability is the most fundamental condition of 
state-building, and is therefore pursued by various means. The rulers’ final purpose may be 
political dominance and may not necessarily be stability as such: it is possible, as Chabal and 
Daloz (1999) pointed out, that rulers make use of disorder for their political dominance. 
Nevertheless, we assume that in a small country like Rwanda, political dominance cannot be 
established without controlling territorial security.  
In the case of post-conflict Rwanda, the physical force of the RPA (subsequently 
redesigned as the RDF) has been the most important basis of political stability. In this period, 
two major military operations were carried out in order to remove security threats: the invasion 
of eastern Zaire (the present DRC) in 1996 and the counter-insurgency operation in western 
Rwanda in 1997-98.  
 Rwandan military interference in the DRC was a response to the national security 
threat posed by militarized Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC.42 The consequences of the 
operation were rather mixed. On the one hand, the operation successfully dismantled 
militarized refugee camps in the region, causing a huge return of Hutu refugees to Rwanda:43 
the operation and the subsequent military involvement in the eastern DRC enabled Rwanda to 
                                                  
41. We lack sufficient space to touch on the restrictions placed on the mass media. See Frère (2007) and 
Beswick (2010) on this point.  
42. We cannot describe here the details of the long and complex process of Rwandan interference in the 
eastern DRC. See Reyntjens (2009). 
43. The majority of refugees who fled into the interior of the DRC were massacred there. Atrocities 
carried out alongside the military operations are documented in, for example, Adelman (2003), Umutesi 
(2004), and United Nations (2010). 
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establish its political order beyond its borders. On the other hand, significant elements 
continued their activities in the eastern DRC: they have remained in the region to date under 
the name of the Force démocratique de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). 
 Counter-insurgency operations were carried out mainly in western Rwanda in 1997 
and 1998, because ex-FAR armed forces had entered that area in the guise of Hutu returnees; 
many civilians, including Hutu returnees, were allegedly slaughtered during these operations. 
According to Amnesty International, an estimated 6,000 civilians were killed between January 
and August 1997 (Amnesty International 1997, 1998). 44  It was the last large-scale 
counter-insurgency operation conducted by the RPF-led government, which has controlled the 
whole country ever since. 
 In addition to direct military operations, the government has institutionalized its 
political power by setting rules that are advantageous to itself, while at the same time it has 
also not hesitated to rely on physical force if necessary.  
The new constitution, which was adopted by referendum in 2003, is a good example of 
this.45 The 2003 constitution, which is generally characterized by democracy and a multi-party 
system, also contains several provisions ensuring continued rule by the RPF. First, it provides 
for an electoral system that is designed to be advantageous for minority rule. Of the 80 
members of the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House), only 53 are elected by universal suffrage. 
The remaining 27 seats are reserved for representatives of women (24 seats), youth (2 seats), 
and the disabled (1 seat). These representatives are selected by members of local 
administrative bodies and/or related official councils.46 Moreover, all 26 members of the 
                                                  
44. As mentioned earlier, killings by RPF soldiers, who have never been properly tried in any court, 
remain a source of discontent among Hutus. 
45. Beswick (2010) analyzes Rwanda’s use of legal measures to control political space. As for the 2003 
Constitution, see also Reyntjens (2003).  
46. Representatives of women are elected by “a joint assembly composed of members of the respective 
District, Municipality, Town or Kigali City Councils and members of the executive committees of 
women’s organizations at the Province, Kigali City, District, Municipalities, Towns and Sector levels.” 
Those for youth and the disabled are respectively elected by the National Youth Council and the 
Federation of the Associations of the Disabled (Constitution of Rwanda, Article 76). 
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Senate are either elected from among, or appointed by, the Executive Committees of local 
administrative bodies, the President of the Republic, the Forum of Political Organizations, and 
academia.47 In short, the number of people elected through universal suffrage is limited 
compared to the number voted in by government-controlled organizations. This is obviously 
advantageous for the RPF, which has kept a tight grip on power since the end of the civil war. 
Second, the Constitution enables the government to arbitrarily use its power based on 
the stipulation against “division.” Article 33 of the Constitution stipulates that “[p]ropagation 
of ethnic, regional, racial or [sic] discrimination or any other form of division is punishable by 
law.” The problem here is that the definition of “division” is not clear, and so this article can be 
invoked to repress political opponents. In fact, such terms as “division” and “divisionism” have 
often been used in Rwanda when the government criticized its opponents, as in the case of the 
two presidential elections held after the civil war.  
The result of the 2003 election was an overwhelming victory for Kagame; he received 
95% of the vote. However, this victory was not all it seemed. In fact, the choice was very 
limited for many Rwandans, as the biggest opposition party supporting the rival candidate 
Faustin Twagiramungu, the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), had been 
dissolved just before the election. State institutions ceaselessly promoted Kagame and 
intimidated his principal rival during the election campaign.48 The situation was quite similar 
during the presidential election in 2010, when a Hutu woman, Victoire Ingabire, who had 
declared herself as a rival candidate, was arrested and charged with “association with a terrorist 
group, propagating the Genocide Ideology, Revisionism and Ethnic Division” (New Times, 
                                                  
47. The Executive Committees of various local administrations (Districts, Municipalities, etc.) elect 12 
members representing each Province and the City of Kigali; the President of the Republic appoints eight 
members ensuring “the representation of historically marginalized communities”, the Forum of Political 
Organizations designates four members, and academic and research staff of public and private 
institutions each elect one representative (Constitution of Rwanda, Article 82). 
48. Human Rights Watch (2003); Amnesty International (2003). See also “Rwanda: A Victory Foretold,” 
Africa Confidential 44 (17): 1-3 (29 August 2003) and “Un triomphe, pour quoi faire?” Jeune afrique 
No. 2225: 57-59 (du 31 août au 6 septembre 2003).  
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April 23, 2010).49 Kagame was re-elected in August with 93% of the vote.  
In sum, the Rwandan government succeeded in taking hold of territorial security 
mainly by its military power and institutional arrangements; if there have been any 
contributions from SSR programs in this process, they have been negligible. Democratic 
institutions were introduced in post-conflict Rwanda, but they were often designed to impart an 
advantage to the incumbent group, which did not hesitate to arbitrarily use its power to repress 
and intimidate rivals. Since the end of the civil war, the RPF has prioritized the stability of its 
own rule over the establishment of democratic governance. In other words, the enhancement of 
state capacity has been pursued much more eagerly than that of state legitimacy. 
 
(3) Socio-economic forms of legitimacy-building 
 Responding to people’s expectations contributes to legitimacy-building, which is a 
necessary part of state-building. In fact, post-conflict Rwanda has performed fairly well in 
terms of providing security and other basic services. Violence and oppression are important, 
but only account for one side of the RPF’s rule. Rwanda’s social sector has also developed 
rapidly since the RPF victory. Such indicators as life expectancy and school enrollment have 
increased considerably. Life expectancy at birth (average of male and female), which was 
around 33 years in 1990, increased to 50 years in 2008. The gross primary school enrollment 
rate increased from 70% in 1990 to 150% in 2008;50 the net primary school enrollment rate 
                                                  
49. The concept of “genocide ideology” has been used for the same purpose as “division” and 
“divisionism”. The Rwandan government enacted its Law Relating to the Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide Ideology (Law No.18/2008 of 23/07/2008) for the purpose of “preventing and punishing the 
crime of genocide ideology” (Article 1). The arbitrary nature of “genocide ideology” is well 
demonstrated in Article 2, which defines it as “an aggregate of thoughts characterized by conduct, 
speeches [sic], documents and other acts aiming at exterminating or inciting others to exterminate 
people basing [sic] on ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, color, physical appearance, sex, language, 
religion or political opinion, committed in normal periods or during war.” On this point, see Human 
Rights Watch (2008). 
50. The gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the population of the 
age group that officially corresponds to the relevant level of education. In this case, it indicates that the 
number of students enrolled in Rwandan primary schools in 2008 was 1.5 times larger than the number 
of children of primary school age. 
27 
improved to over 95% in 2007 and 2008.51 In addition to the improvement in the social sector, 
high economic growth may have contributed to ameliorating people’s living standards. The 
GDP growth rate, which has generally been high in recent years, reached 11% in 2008. It is 
very likely these kinds of performance have increased the legitimacy of the regime.52  
However, three caveats about this positive socio-economic performance are worth 
stressing. First, the rapidly improving social sector has been supported by massive 
international aid: between 2001 and 2006, an average of 50.6% of total aid from DAC 
countries was invested in the social sector.53 Ministries in charge of this sector thus received 
abundant funding from abroad. In 2008, the amount of sector budget support for education was 
estimated at 31% of the total Ministry of Education (MINEDUC) budget, which was twice as 
large as the Ministry’s development budget (Republic of Rwanda 2007). The improved 
performance in the social sector in post-conflict Rwanda was made possible thanks to the 
massive inflow of international aid (Marysse et al. 2006).  
Second, Rwanda’s high economic growth has been enabled by its political control of 
the eastern DRC. Although economic growth has been sustained by considerable increases in 
exports, a remarkable change in the composition of export goods has been observed recently. 
Rwandan exports before the civil war consisted almost exclusively of coffee and tea; after the 
war, mineral resources became one of its most important exports. In 2006, mineral resources 
such as niobium, tantalum, and vanadium made up 18.2% of total exports, thus constituting the 
second-largest set of export items after coffee (World Bank 2009, 85). These mineral resources 
were undoubtedly mined in the DRC, then transported to and exported from Rwanda. This 
change in the export structure was a clear result of Rwandan military interference in the eastern 
                                                  
51. The data are based on World Development Indicators. 
52. Exploring sources of various kind of legitimacy, OECD (2010) maintains that the provision of 
security as well as social services bolsters state legitimacy. They call this “output (or performance) 
legitimacy.”  
53. Calculated by the author from OECD (2008a; 2007b). 
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DRC.54 
Third, despite rapid economic growth, poverty in Rwanda continues: Rwanda’s Gini 
coefficient55 in 2000 was 0.468, which was higher than its mid-1980s level of 0.289 (UNDP 
2006, 2007b); in 2006, it further increased to 0.510 (Government of Rwanda, 2007, 13).56 
Recent high economic growth has brought about considerable development in urban areas, 
with a rapid population increase.57 It has been pointed out that many Tutsi returnees dwell in 
urban areas and enjoy the benefits of economic growth (Ansoms 2009; Silva-Leander, 
forthcoming); in contrast, in rural areas, where the overwhelmingly majority of the population 
lives, poverty still persists (UNDP 2007a).  
Even if economic growth has a poor effect on poverty reduction, it is politically 
important for the RPF to ensure that its strong supporters, Tutsi returnees, receive the benefits. 
In fact, the RPF-led government has provided various resources for their supporters. Land 
distribution was one outstanding example of patronage politics. With the RPF military victory, 
a huge number of Tutsi refugees, who had fled because of political turmoil and subsequent 
persecution, returned to Rwanda after a long absence.58 Land was distributed to Tutsi returnees 
through a quite radical method: when Tutsi refugees returned after the 1994 RPF victory, the 
                                                  
54. Many reports and articles have discussed Rwanda’s military interference in the DRC and its illegal 
exploitation of mineral resources. See, for example, United Nations (2001, 2002). Marysse and André 
(2001) estimated that the benefit Rwanda has acquired through its illegal exports of minerals (coltan, 
diamonds, and gold) was equivalent to 7% and 8% of its GDP in 1999 and 2000, respectively. See also 
Global Witness (2011). 
55. The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality. It is expressed as a figure between 0 and 1; 0 
indicates total equality and 1 indicates extreme inequality. 
56. In a similar vein, Ansoms (2005) points out that Rwanda’s post-genocide economic growth has had 
little effect on reducing poverty; Silva-Leander (forthcoming) argues that the marked enlargement of 
income inequality is attributable to the significant injection of illicit revenue into the Rwandan economy 
as a consequence of its invasion of the DRC.  
57. Before the war, Rwanda was one of the least urbanized countries in Africa: its urban population was 
less than 10% of the total population. Although the number of urban dwellers increased rapidly after the 
war, the proportion of the population living in rural areas remains high (82% in 2008 based on World 
Development Indicators). 
58. Estimating the number of Tutsi returnees has been difficult. The number varies from 600,000 
(Huggins 2009, 69) and 700,000 (Bruce 2009, 112) to 900,000 (Office of United Nations Resident 
Coordinator for Rwanda 2000, 2). The refugees were produced in the independence conflict (the 
so-called “social revolution”) and afterwards (especially in 1973). On this point, see Lemarchand (1970) 
and Reyntjens (1985). 
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local authorities recommended they not return to their original birthplaces, but instead occupy 
vacant land, especially in the eastern part of the country. By the time they returned, almost all 
the Hutu inhabitants of the region had fled to neighboring countries. Therefore, to start their 
new lives in Rwanda, the Tutsi returnees occupied land and houses left by the original 
inhabitants. When the Hutus returned after 1996, the local authorities ordered them to divide 
their land equally and give half to Tutsi returnees (Bruce 2009; Huggins 2009; Takeuchi and 
Marara 2005; 2009). This policy of “land sharing” can be seen as resource allocation for Tutsi 
returnees, with the aim of strengthening the political basis of the government.59 
 
(4) Characteristics of state-building  
Based on the arguments in this section, two characteristics of state-building in 
post-conflict Rwanda can be abstracted. First, the coercive power of the RPF has been the main 
driving force of this process. Its complete military victory in the civil war and in military 
counter-insurgency operations provided the basis of political stability. Second, the RPF-led 
government has sought legitimacy through various means. In addition to political stability, 
socio-economic conditions have generally improved since the end of the civil war. In particular, 
improvements in the social sector have been remarkable. Moreover, resources such as land 
have been distributed through patronage.  
The international community has generally endorsed and supported such government 
actions. Since the civil war, Rwanda has been continuously provided with large amounts of 
foreign aid (Marysse et al. 2006; Beswick 2010; Hayman 2008). Only a few donors decided to 
suspend aid, even when Rwanda’s continuing support for the Tutsi-led rebels in the eastern 
DRC was revealed (United Nations 2008b). The country has been quite successful to date in 
“domesticating the world” (Reyntjens 2011).  
                                                  
59. Although we lack sufficient space for a description, the provision of housing and villagization 
(imidugudu) can be understood in the same context (Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2000; Bruce 2009).  
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 We saw in the previous section that although the Gacaca and the RDRC program 
have achieved objectives set by the government, they have not made much of a contribution to 
enhancing democratic governance in the security sector. From our analysis, it becomes clear 
that these initiatives were implemented in a situation in which the RPF strove to establish its 
own political order. These reforms in the security sector were implemented only to the extent 
to which they contributed to, and did not threaten, the RPF-led political order.  
 
Conclusion 
 Our examination of Rwanda’s experiences in SSR, the Gacaca and RDRC programs, 
clarified a considerable gap between norms and realities. These two policy initiatives in the 
security sector have not contributed to the normative objectives of SSR: capacity and 
legitimacy building in the sector; in other words, establishing norms such as enhancing 
political stability and the rule of law. Rather, political stability was realized by military 
operations and other institutional arrangements; their contributions to the rule of law were 
questionable at best. SSR was implemented only insofar as it did not threaten the existing 
political order. In other words, international SSR norms have been subordinated to RPF-led 
state-building.  
 In reality, subordination of international norms to state-building processes is not 
unusual. In post-conflict countries, political stability is often prioritized over democratic 
governance. This tendency has been especially marked in countries in which one of multiple 
warring parties took power through a military victory. Generally speaking, political stability in 
post-conflict settings is critical for a ruler aiming to consolidate power; especially after a 
one-sided victory, the ruler’s willingness to control, and capacity for controlling, state power 
are much stronger than those of external actors seeking to impose international norms. With 
these realities in mind, the subordination of international norms is therefore not surprising in 
itself.  
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In this sense, Rwanda should not be considered to be an exception, but should rather 
be regarded as an example indicating a typical pattern of post-conflict state-building. From this 
viewpoint, it is important to examine the implications of this state-building for peace-building: 
the extent to which this state-building ensures sate legitimacy in the eyes of the population. As 
the sources of state legitimacy are various and not limited to international norms such as 
democracy and the rule of law, deficiencies in terms of such norms do not directly equate to a 
lack of state legitimacy (OECD 2010). In the case of Rwanda, we can find causes of optimism 
as well as pessimism in terms of factors contributing to a durable peace.  
On the one hand, the Rwandan state has undoubtedly enhanced its capacity for service 
provision in the post-conflict era: internal security is well established; the quality and the 
quantity of basic services such as public health and education have made remarkable progress; 
and corruption is well-controlled. It is safe to say that these improvements in state capacity 
have bettered the lives of many Rwandans, thus contributing to enhancing state legitimacy. 
Although such an enhancement of legitimacy cannot be measured by the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, its effect on “output legitimacy” should not be underestimated. 
On the other hand, worrisome factors in terms of conflict prevention should be pointed 
out: Gacaca is generally regarded as “victor’s justice” by Hutus; RCDC reforms have not 
brought about any significant change in the power structure of the military, in which Tutsi 
former refugees prevail; and those who have benefitted most from rapid economic growth are 
most likely to be Tutsis returnees living in urban areas. These facts show that ethnic cleavage 
remains critical, or even may have widened, in various dimensions of post-genocide Rwanda.60 
As a result, the difference between the losers and victors in the armed conflict as well as in the 
post-conflict political economy may be perceived ethnically, under the name of Hutu and Tutsi; 
this will lead to creating and strengthening ethnic grievances among Hutus.  
Although the government has officially declared that there are no ethnic distinctions in 
                                                  
60. For a similar argument, see Ingelaere (2010).  
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Rwanda, divisions clearly exist, and in the popular perception they are even wider. This is a 
dangerous symptom. Ethnically perceived discontent may erupt someday when the political 
power of the RPF becomes weaker. It is high time, therefore, to examine political, economic, 
and social measures for alleviating ethnically divided perceptions. 
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